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SYSTEMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION*
Until recent years there was but one system of teaching law in
the schools. It was the good old system employed in all the profes-
sions of introducing the student to text-books of recognized author-
ity and compelling him to commit their contents to memory, under
the guidance of an instructor. As shown by Professor Theodore
W. Dwight, "it was thie method advocated in the Roman law of
introducting students to their first knowledge of that remarkable
system of jurisprudence." In the earlier days, the work of the
instructor was limited to ascertaining that the student had properly
memorized the text and to oral explanations. The student's mem-
orizing feat being accomplished, he was admitted to the bar. But
because law, like medicine, is not an exact science and a working
knowledge of law involves knowledge not only of its rules, but of
how those rules are applied, only the preliminary stage of a man's
legal education was finished when he passed out of the law school into
the ranks of the profession. While the swearing in of a law school
graduate placed upon him the imprimatur of the court in form
notifying the public that he was competent to practice, it, in fact,
was little more than a permission to enter upon the second stage of
his education in which he would be given the opportunity to learn
the application of the rules of law. Before his admission to the bar,
he had been studying law only in the abstract, but afterwards he
began a voluntary course of delving into the undigested mass of its
original sources,-always more or less at the expense of clients, who
were compelled to take the consequences of his lack of knowledge.
Of late years, public opinion and legislative action have forced
a very substantial raising of the standards of admission to the bar.
The principal law schools of the country have more than met these
requirements by adding to. their courses of instruction, as a means
of teaching the application of law as well as of aiding the student
to digest and crystallize his knowledge of the rules, an extended
and systematic study of precedents.
But the mere addition of the systematic study of cases to the
work of the law school was by no means a readjustment of the meth-
ods of legal education. It was nothing more than the extension of
*A public address on the Lafayette S. Foster foundation delivered before
the Yale Law School, April 15, 1907.
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the field of school work to include and systematize work which had
formerly been left to the student to perform without system after
his admission to the bar and generally according to the exigencies
of practice.
The fact that a study of the precedents, either before or after
admission to the bar, can not be dispensed with in the acquisition
of a legal education, some years ago led a number of the most bril-
liant law instructors of this country to the conclusion that what was
indispensable as an aid to the student, to infuse into him the mean-
ing and spirit of the law and to teach him its application-in short,
to give shape as a whole to what would otherwise remain to him a
collection of arbitrary and more or less unrelated rules, and to
develop his powers of analysis, furnished the only proper means of
systematic study. The "case system" was born and was adopted by
one after another of many of the law schools of the country. By
many of its enthusiastic admirers its alleged superiority over the
way in which Coke and Mansfield and Marshall and Lincoln
acquired their knowledge of the law has been proclaimed as though
it were not only an innovation in the method of teaching, but a new
and royal road to learning. The very name itself soon developed
commercial value as a trade-mark, and as such it has not gone unex-
ploited.
The case system consists in teaching law from start to finish by
means of cases as a basis. The student, without any preliminary
teaching in the terminology and fundamental rules of the science
that he pr6poses to master, is furnished with a compilation of pre-
cedents, arranged with masterly skill to show how rules that origi-
nated in primitive conditions have been developed to meet the com-
plexity of modern life. From the study of these cases it is de-
manded of him that he first extract the rules of law and then trace
them through the process of development down to their present-day
application. Nothing could be more simple-in its statement.
The superiority of one system over another can be proved con-
clusively only by results. The case system has not been long enough
in use to furnish this proof. The most distinguished professional
men of the present day are men whose student life ended before the
day of the case system, and in expressing a preference for the old-
fashioned way of studying law I am not so unwise as to assert more
than a belief, which I hope is not grounded in prejudice so as to be
irremovable by evidence, that the man who undertakes to study
under the case system does so under a handicap. But in the absence
of the proof, which I doubt Will be ever forthcoming, the question
must be open to debate, with the burden of the argument on those
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who champion the innovation. And this is the way that burden is
sustained by Professor James Brown Scott, one of the most distin-
guished law instructors of this country, in an address delivered at the
opening of the George Washington University in September, 19o6:
"In order to forecast the law, and make a judgment in a particular
instance a development or prolongation of precedent, rather than a guess,
law must be studied historically and the threads of development knit into a
single strand. . . The only reasonable and the only satisfactory way
of dealing with the English law is to bring to bear upon it the historical
method. Mere legal terminology may seem a dead thing. Mix history with
it, and it clothes itself with life.
"Admitting that law is a science, it necessarily follows that it should be
studied as a science; and if, as Descartes said, the first principle of the phil-
osopher is to doubt, the first step in science is experiment, and perhaps the
happy combination of doubt and experiment may produce, not merely a
science, but a philosophy of law.
"Almost within our own day we have discarded the text-book for the
experiment, and high schools as well as colleges and universities turn the
student into the laboratory. Chemistry, for example, is no longer a pleasing
exhibition performed by an instructor in a darkened room to the delectation
of freshmen. The student is put to the test, he takes the problem, he exper-
iments, he solves it, and in so doing acquires a training and knowledge
which cannot or which should not be divorced. The text-book is not neg-
lected, for otherwise each student would have to reconstruct in his labora-
tory the experiments of the ages; but the training and knowledge gained in
the laboratory fit the student to read with pleasure and profit approved texts,
and in rare cases the training and knowledge so acquired may advance by
experiment the science of chemistry.
• * . "Anyone who has had experience in the class-room knows that the
student is awakened by an illustration taken from the professional experi-
ence of the instructor, and that the concrete illustration remains when the
abstract principle is forgotten which it was sought to illustrate.
"If, then, the excellence of the text-book method is found in discarding
the text and resorting to the concrete case, it necessarily follows that a dis-
cussion of a subject based solely upon selected concrete cases should com-
mend itself to teacher and student alike. The concrete case is grasped by
any student of average intelligence, and, once grasped, he is prepared to
follow in detail the discussion of the case. If to the concrete case hypo-
thetical instances and modifications be suggested, the student is led perforce
into a theoretical discussion in which he discovers the theory underlying the
case and its modifications. By the constant application of this method, not
as a test of memory, but as an investigation of principles of law, the student
is led insensibly to a grasp of legal principle. The concrete case suggests the
theory, and theory and practice thus go hand in hand. From their happy
combination, knowledge of the law is produced. By means of this method
the student is the chief factor; he trains himself; he discovers and reconciles
difficulties, and receives in proper cases the guidance and assistance of the
instructor."*
*Published in the American Law School Review, November, xgo6.
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This, then, is the argument in favor of the case system in teach-
ing law-a system differing in no wise from the old-fashioned
course of instruction which trained the master minds of the profes-
sion except that the latter, by teaching the student the rudiments of
the law-its origin, its terminology, and its fundamental rules-
prepares him to enter, without loss of precious time and needed
energy and to pursue along the lines of least resistance, the scienti-
fic, broadening and training part of his legal education-the study
of cases. These three together--origin, terminology, and funda-
mental rules-furnish the language and conceptions of the law,
which must be acquired in some way before the real work of train-
ing and development can begin; for.no man can understand the
application of law made in the concrete case until he can think and
speak in terms of the law.
The only question at issue, then, between the advocates of the
two systems is as to the wisdom of abandoning entirely the dogmatic
and exegetical preparatory course designed to facilitate the advanced
work, throwing the student, who is as yet ignorant even of what
law is, into the strenuous task of constructing at once the plans.
foundations and superstructure of an edifice for which he is fur-
nished with nothing but the prepared materials of the superstructure
-not even a knowledge of the simplest principles of the builder's
art.
The high priests of the case system cult are extremely enthusi-
astic in their propaganda. It strikes them with the force of divine
truth that a line of study which flooded their already prepared minds
with the light of revelation must be not only the logical but logi-
cally the sole line of study--dispensing with the necessity for the
elementary instruction which enabled them from the very start to
enjoy the more scientifically mapped-out line of study as at once an
intellectual treat and a mental profit.
It is quite evident that when Professor Scott says that the excel-
lence of the text-book method is found in discarding the text and
resorting to the concrete case and therefore the discussion of a
subject should be based solely upon selected cases, the persuasive
force of his argument is due to the fact that he has so cleverly stated
his premise in the form of a paradox that it has all the charm of an
epigram. It is needless to say that the excellence of the text-book
method is not found in discarding the text, but in supplementing
it. Is the excellence of medicine in illness found in discarding
medicine and resorting to scientific nursing? And if, in illness,
medicine can be made excellent and effective only by supplementing
it with scientific nursing, does it necessarily follow that the sole
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treatment indicated is a course of scientific nursing? If the efficacy
of a drug administered in composition has once been demonstrated,
does it necessarily follow that this drug's stipreme efficacy will be
found in administering it pure?
The great trouble with all teachers-the great trouble with all
men in discussing methods of instruction-is their tendency to for-
get the difficulties that they themselves experienced in the .early
stage of their own student career, and their consequent inability to
understand and appreciate the difficulties to be overcome by those
who are now in their turn beginners. They are unable to go back
over the years and put themselves in the mental attitude of the
student. Especially is this true of teachers of such a lawless science
as the science of law. But in justice to law instructors it must be
said that the weakness in their teaching is largely due to excessive
modesty. They take too much for granted. The elementary prop-
ositions which once brought them to the verge of nervous prostra-
tion have now become to them self-evident truths, and they cannot
believe that the members of a succeeding generation could possibly
be as dull as they themselves once were. We are all unfortunately
given to teaching over the heads of our students. And when, to
difficulties arising out of the personal equation, we add difficulties
due to system, there ought to be some overpoweringly good reason
for it.
When the advocate for the case system says that "almost within
our own day we have discarded the text-book for the experiment,
and high schools as well as colleges and universities turn the student
into the laboratory," it seems to me that he confounds addition with
substitution.
Laboratory work (within which term must be included the case
reading now prescribed to students in all schools of law) is either
demonstrative or experimental. Formerly, none but demonstrative
work, and but little of that, formed any part of a scholastic train-
ing. But every professional and every technical school has been
forced to make laboratory work a very substantial part of its means
of imparting knowledge. Except in the case system law schools,
this laboratory work has been taken up, or extended, not in substi-
tution for, but partly explanatory of, and partly in addition to, the
text-book or lecture work, which was formerly the sole, or nearly
the sole, basis of instruction. Except in the case system law schools,
the text-book or lecture has not been discarded as a basis of instruc-
tion. But as surely'as the adolescent must have a food differing
from that of the infant, the vanishing point (in value) of mere
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exegetical teaching is reached, and the good work can only be car-
ried on by means of the laboratory.
Would you teach a man surveying by giving him a transit and
chain and sending him out into the field to measure lines and angles,
that from the multitude of his observations he may deduce the rules
by which areas are computed? Or, would you first teach the boy
arithmetic and trigonometry with a text-book. (and bireh-rod, if
necessary) and then send him into the field? Can you imagine a
boy beginning the study of anatomy in the dissecting room?
The fact is that in every line of technical instruction, barring
only the law, a preliminary course of dogmatical exegetical teaching
is absolutely required; and although laboratory work is often taken
up in connection with it, such work is purely for demonstrative
purposes.
It is literally true that schools of technology have discarded the
printed text-book, but it would be a mistake to suppose that they
have discarded the text-book system or that they have substituted
laboratory work for the printed text-book. Inquiry at the Carnegie
Schools of Technology, in Pittsburgh, where they may well be sup-
posed to be up-to-date, both in their methods of teaching and in the
completeness of their laboratory equipment, elicits the information
that no text-books are used, and there is an intimation that in these
days inventions and discoveries follow one another so fast that up-
to-date text-books in physical science are not procurable. To the
question, Are the students from the start turned into the laboratory
there to acquire their knowledge by constructive work? the answer
received was a decided negative. Elementary instruction is there
given entirely by means of lectures. Laboratory work is required
in connection with the lectures, but only for the purposes of illus-
tration and review-to clarify and fix in the mind of the student the
information imparted to 'him in the lecture-room.
Whether the text-book or the lecture should be used in teach-
ing is a matter quite outside of this discussion. In individual cases,
whether the one mode or the other should be used is probably a
question of expediency and not of pedagogy. Both the text-book
and the lecture belong to the same exegetical or text-book system as
opposed to the case system, and except from a pedagogical point
of view it is immaterial whether the student prepare from a printed
text-book before the class-room exercise or do his studying after-
wards from the text which he has written himself.
It must be remembered that an introduction to law is an intro-
duction to new and strange conceptions-some of them so new and
strange that they baffle for a long time both the comprehension of
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the student and the ingenuity of the instructor. For instance, the
famous Professor Theodore W. Dwight described seisin as "the
union of a physical fact with a metaphysical conception." When a
man is asked for the first time to understand the peculiar blend
produced by the union of a physical fact with a metaphysical con-
ception, is it to be wondered at if he feels his reason totter?The reports of cases were not written for students. They Were
not written to teach law. They are communications from the courts
to the profession in justification of the courts' decisions. Not being
addressed to laymen, but to members of the same profession with
the judges, all of them supposedly learned in the law equally with
the judges, naturally these communications take for granted a
knowledge of the fundamental rules and conceptions of law.
Imagine the educational value to a beginner of one of these
judicial opinions!
But while a single case can hardly be said* to have educational
value standing by itself, it is still true that the great mass of decis-
ions, whether we consider them to have been correctly or incorrectly
reached, are based upon fundamental rules of law as to the exist-
ence of which there is no controversy. And just as patience, perse-
verance and intellect discovered the key to the cuneiform inscrip-
tions and translated them for us, so it is possible for the same
qualities, in the multitude of decided cases, first to find, and then to
trace, the rules of the common law.
But what a task a student sets himself when he starts by this
method into his law studies! He is not starting in as the explorer
of an uncharted region. On the contrary, he is proposing to famil-
iarize himself with a country, the maps of whose landmarks lie upon
every shelf; and yet, it is insisted that he should put all these aids
out of sight and do independently the work of an original explorer.
To justify this apparent waste of time and energy there ought to
be some overpoweringly good reason. And the advocates of the
system have found this reason in the peculiarly intellectual training
which it gives to the students who pursue it. Certainly, no system
could possibly be devised that would better accomplish the desired
result of imparting to the legal mind an intensely intellectual bent.
When a man is put to work in an unknown field to discover for
himself and almost by himself the causes of a multitude of effects,
and having discovered and formulated them, to bring them scien-
tifically into correlation, he must necessarily tax his mental powers
to the very utmost. The original character of the work, the argu-
mentative method of work, and the intensity of the effort put fdrth
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are the formula for working out this intellectual training, which
develops to an unusual degree the analytical faculty.
If power of analysis is the one supreme thing for the law student
of proper ambition to strive for, if it is the most important part of
the equipment of the great advocate, the safe counsellor, the even-
minded judge, then, indeed, to continue to teach law by the old-
fashioned text-book system is but the folly of men who are behind
the times and whose clear duty it is to admit their error and to put
into the hands of the entering student a compilation of so many hun-
dred cases and oblige him from them to discover for himself the
existence and doctrine of contingent, springing, and shifting uses
with all their absurd and disturbing results.
There are two objections urged against the case system of study
for all but those who propose to follow the theory as distinguished
from the practice of the law.
The first objection is what would seem to be a natural tendency
to over-train and over-develop the analytical faculty. Both obser-
vafion and report incline me to the belief that it gives to an undue
proportion of students a tendency, which they never lose altogether,
to play the game, so to speak, strictly according to rule, for pure
love of the game, and without regard to the stakes. They follow
out their legal inquiries with absolute logical precision, and the
desirability of making a proper application of the law is entirely over-
shadowed in their minds by the importance of following a proposi-
tion out to its absolutely logical conclusion. They love to split hairs
and to argue technicalities which have nothing to do with the merits
of the case except that, being raised, they delay or prevent considera-
tion of the merits. They become intellectual spendthrifts; they
forget that the science of law is a "lawless science," to apply which
well learning must be tempered with wisdom. They fail to realize
that "law is not a science in itself . . . [but] a resultant of
social forces,"' and that the great judicial decisions-those that
have had an important bearing on the national life-have resulted
quite as much from a clear view of public needs and public opinion
as from the application of precedent. 2
The lawyer's opinion of the law upon a complicated state of
facts may well be compared and contrasted with the mathematician's
i. Brooks Adams, Esq., in the Green Bag, January, i9o7.
2. Professor Hershey, in The International Law and Diplomacy of the
Russo-Japanese War, p. 85, expresses an opinion with regard to the study
of international law mainly or exclusively by the case system which tends to
support this view.
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computation of the resolution of forces. The mathematician's fac-
tors are all physical and capable of being measured with extreme
accuracy. The result of his calculations is absolutely correct, or so
nearly so that any possible error may be disregarded as a negligible
quantity. No two competent mathematicians will vary in the results
of their several calculations.
On the other hand, few states of fact can be settled by the appli-
cation of a single rule of law. Few rules of law run in parallel
lines. The most that any lawyer can do is to find the point where
two or more rules meet in conflict, or where precedent is not quite in
accord with the public needs, it may be with the national integrity,
and then estimate the result. The making of a constructive lawyer
calls for more than great power of analysis, more than a historical
knowledge of precedent-it calls for the even development of the
mental equipment to the knowledge and appreciation of a compli-
cated array of forces which act and interact-and the rule that pre-
cedents must be follQwed is but one of these forces. It is this very
necessity for the constant exercise of practical judgment to avoid
being led astray by the intellectual bent that brings the personal
equation so prominently into the practice of law.
The graduate from under the case system makes a wonderful
brief writer and an equally good digester of the reports; but his
training has had a natural tendency to send him up into the intel-
lectual clouds, and as long as he stays there his confrere of more
homely, but broader training, has the advantage over him as a pro-
fessional factor.
The second objection is that the courses under the case system
require the expenditure of more time than do the equivalent courses
in the text-book schools and that there is an actual loss of valuable
time at the beginning of the first year, all without a compensating
balance in the superior development of the powers of analysis. That
there is this actual loss of time there can be no doubt. The men of
my acquaintance from the case schools tell me without a dissenting
voice that they spent the first few months of their law course in a
miserably discouraging, straining effort to understand in order to
learn, and at the end of these months all that they had to show for
their time and strain was an ability to learn.
From the very nature of the case system more actual hours of
work are required by the student under it to cover a given amount
of ground than are needed by the text-book student. To anyone
acquainted with the intensive method of mental cultivation applied in
the case schools, this must be self-evident. But if any demonstra-
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tion were needed, a comparison of the curriculums of the schools
under the two methods would give it.
In the text-book schools that have an adequate teachifig force
the course of instruction is generally divided into three stages
according to a method which has lately been adopted in the best
schools of technology and to which Cornell University has given the
name of "the concentric system."
In the first stage, under this system, the law student is put
through a course .of elementary law which covers practically the
whole range of municipal law, both substantive and adjective. In
this stage he gets a bird's-eye view, as it were, of the entire body of
law and so is quickly made to appreciate the exact nature of the
task which is before him. The concepions of the law are explained
with the utmost care and patience and are dinned into him until at
least he acquires a familiarity with them which passes for compre-
hension and which in the second stage becomes comprehension if
there is any material in him out of which to make a lawyer. From
the text-book he memorizes the definitions and elementary rules
and these are elaborately explained to him in the lecture-room and
their application is illustrated from every point of view with the
homeliest and simplest examples that the ingenuity of the instructor
can devise. There is always kept prominently in sight the
necessity for getting at the student's point of view-for finding out
the peculiar difficulty in the individual's mind and removing it.
In this stage the student is not spending months in a heart-breaking
effort to find light whereby to advance his footsteps. First, his
curiosity is aroused by the mere statements of the hitherto un-
dreamed of relations in which he, personally, stands to the state
and to other men. Then his interest is excited by the familiar char-
acter of the illustrations used and his ready ability to make personal
applications. He is learning law from the very start. And the
moment he begins, to be interested, -which is a question of but days
and not months, he takes naturally to a process of self-instruction
which does him just as much good as the instruction he gets in the
class-room. He begins to ponder law, to talk law, to discuss it and
quarrel over it, and even to dream about it. He has begun to absorb
law at every pore and to think and talk in terms of the law. This is
the first stage, and during its progress the student is not encouraged
to read cases for fear of mental indigestion.
The second stage is a repetition of the first, but in a circle of
much greater radius. The student takes up the application of the
rules of law in all but the most difficult branches. Text-books are
the basis of the work done and these are supplemented by discus-
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sion in the class-room and by the study of leading cases which have
been carefully selected, not with a view to inductive study, but for
the purpose of illustrating the propositions of the text with author-
itative decisions of what the law now is.
And the work of the third stage is in still larger concentric cir-
cle. Except in some non-technical subjects, the work is now mainly
carried on by means of cases, and the inductive system is applied
in all its rigor.
The supposed merits of this system of instruction, which, in the
minds of its advocates, give it superiority over the case system, are
that the interest of the student is aroused sooner and he finds himself
more promptly in receipt of dividends from his investment. The
method of study is far less intensive and in some of its phases the
work is more evenly divided between the student and the instructor.
This not only allows the addition of technical subjects to the cur-
riculum, permitting a broader field to be covered, but leaves the
time and the strength for advanced courses in comparative juris-
prudence, Roman law, international law, diplomacy, and economics,
with all their mellowing and harmonizing effects. What the student
has lost in acuteness of mental vision which the case system would
have given him he has gained in the actual amount of law that he
knows and in breadth of view. Other things than the mere system
of teaching being equal, after his admission to practice he may not
with such absolute precision as his case-taught brother reason from
precedent to case at bar, but he has been taught to appreciate the
lawlessness of the science-that, although law is of divine essence
it has a tremendous human compound, and that the application of
law is not always a matter of strict logic, but is generally a matter
of mixed logic and expediency.
Everybody concedes that all educational methods and systems
ought to be arranged with reference to the capacity of the average
man rather than the brilliant man, who may be trusted to reach the
best results whatever his choice of system may be, and to keep his
mental powers in equilibrium during the process. It is the man of
merely average ability who runs the risk of losing the perfect bal-
ance between the logical process and judgment and of becoming a
technical faddist. It is the fault of the American lawyer at his best
that he tends to over-technicality, and it may well be questioned
whether this tendency is not in large part responsible for the parlous
condition into which the administration of justice in many of our
states has fallen. We complain in this country about our rules of
procedure, which tend to exasperating delay-delays in making up
the pleadings, delays in reaching a verdict, and, worst of all, delays
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in enforcing the judgment. Are the rules of procedure wholly to
blame for this state of affairs? Comparing the administration of
justice in this country with that of England, we find our courts hide-
bound by their reverence for technicalities. Losing sight of the
public good and of the real interests of their clients, opposing law-
yers will expend purely intellectual ammunition the whole length of
a long skirmish line. I have known counsel for the plaintiff to
make a motion to expunge words technically superfluous, but whose
presence in the answer had not the slightest tendency to distort or
obscure the issue. And then, after serious and lengthy argument
with citation of authorities, the judge would take the papers with a
grave face and reserve his decision with leave to both sides to file
briefs. Both lawyers and judges are so afraid of not being logi-
cally and technically correct that every detail of a case is threshed
over, often more than once, until the proceedings are drawn out
beyond all reason.
If I am right in my assertion of the American lawyer's tendency
and in my belief that this tendency is partially responsible for what
amounts to a national misfortune, ought we not to work away from
this tendency and to do so, if necessary, even at the cost of some
intellectual training? John Wurts.
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